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CHILD CUSTODY: SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE TOWARD CHILDREN OR
PROCEDURAL PURITY FOR PARENTS?-Pasqualone v. Pasqualone, 63

Ohio St.2d 96, 406 N.E.2d 1121 (1980).
INTRODUCTION

Under the current state of child custody law, children are often
transported from one state to another while their parents battle for the
right to enjoy permanent custody.' Even after custody has been awarded to one of the parties, the stability of the child's future may still be
uncertain. The Uniform Laws Commission asserts that those who lose
a court battle over custody are frequently unwilling to accept the judgment of the court and will abduct the child or fail to return him after a
visit.' Even though these parents have illegally abducted their children,
they often relitigate the matter in another jurisdiction in an attempt to
find a judge who will grant their plea for custody.3
In response to this confusion, the Ohio Legislature" adopted the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA).' This Act was designed to remedy the practices of "self-help" and "seize-and-run"
which became more beneficial to parents than the orderly processes of
6
the law.

Underlying the entire Act is the concept that to avoid jurisdictional conflicts and confusions which have done serious harm to innumerable
children, a court in one state must assume major responsibility to deter1.

UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT (Commissioners'

Prefatory

Note).
2. See Foster, Child Snatching and Custodial Fights: The Case for the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 28 HAST. L.J. 1011 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Foster].
Although child snatching has always been illegal, new federal legislation has been
passed which may curb the illegal removal of children. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611 (1981). This Act requires that state courts give
full faith and credit to the custody decrees of other states. Furthermore, the bill
declares it to be congressional intent that the FBI treat parents in "illegal custody" of
their children as violators of the criminal code section on interstate flight to avoid prosecution. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976).
3.

UNIFORM

CHILD CUSTODY

JURISDICTION ACT (Commissioners'

Prefatory

Note).
4. On October 25, 1977, the Ohio Legislature adopted the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.21-.37 (Page 1980). For an

analysis of the Act see Geron, A Brief Analysis of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 51 OHIO BAR 347 (1978); MILLIGAN, OHIO PRAC. § 4047.02 (1981).
5. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 1-28.
6. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT (Commissioners' Prefatory
Note).
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mine who is to have custody of a particular child; that this court must reach
out for help of courts in other states in order to arrive at a fully informed
judgment which transcends state lines and considers all claimants,
residents, and non-residents, on an equal basis and from the standpoint of
the welfare of the child. 7
In 1980, the Ohio Supreme Court had the opportunity to interpret
the Act in the case of Pasqualone v. Pasqualone. This casenote involves three general issues which are germane to child custody disputes. First, should the final determination of custody be irresolute
because a defendant parent refuses to litigate the matter in a particular
jurisdiction? Second, do amendable custody decrees further the child's
best interest? Third, should a court direct its attention towards insuring substantial justice for the defendant parent, or should the court's
primary concern be focused on the future welfare of the child?
FACTS OF THE CASE

Bridget and David Pasqualone were married in Ohio on December
20, 1975, two months after the birth of their daughter, Jennifer. After
experiencing difficulties during the first two years of marriage, 8 the parties executed a separation agreement giving Bridget custody of Jennifer. 9
The agreement stipulated that Bridget was not to remove the child from
Indiana or Ohio without David's written consent.' 0 Nonetheless, on
Feburary 12, 1978, Bridget and Jennifer moved from Indiana to Illinois
without first obtaining David's permission. 1' On July 5, 1978, Bridget
filed for dissolution of marriage and custody of the child in the Circuit
Court of Cook County, Illinois. 2 Eight days later, the trio met at an airport in Fort Wayne, Indiana. At that time David took Jennifer for a visit
7. Id.
8. In February 1976, Bridget and Jennifer moved to Wickliffe, Ohio to live with
David's parents while David completed his education in Cincinnati. Upon completion
of his schooling, David rejoined his wife and child. The family unit continued to reside
together until July 1977, when David and Bridget were separated.
9. Usually separation agreements are valid as long as they do not tend to induce
divorce or separation. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 326 (1968). Even
though the parties cannot control the courts in the granting or denial of divorce, they
may attempt to control the financial incidents of litigation. Frequently, the major issue
of enforceability of separation agreements focuses upon the degree to which the courts
are willing to accept the arrangements made by the parties. For an excellent treatment
of this topic, see Comment, Divorce Agreements: Independent Contract or Incorporation in Decree, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 138 (1952).
10. Brief for Appellee at 1, Pasqualone v. Pasqualone, 63 Ohio St. 2d 96, 406
N.E.2d 1121 (1980).
11. Id.
12. In re Pasqualone, No. 78 D 15817 (Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,
August 16, 1978) (judgment for dissolution of marriage).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/14
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to Ohio which was to last for two weeks. He later refused to surrender
Jennifer.' 3 On July 15, 1978, David received "actual notice""' of
Bridget's Illinois action. Two days later, he filed for divorce and custody
of Jennifer in Ohio.' 5
In October 1978, the Illinois court granted a dissolution of the
marriage and issued an order granting Bridget permanent custody of
Jennifer. With the Illinois judgment in hand, Bridget filed a writ of
habeas corpus'6 to secure custody of Jennifer in the Juvenile Court
Division of the Court of Common Pleas, Lake County, Ohio. The
Ohio court denied Bridget's plea for habeas corpus on jurisdictional
grounds and ordered that permanent custody of Jennifer be awarded
to David Pasqualone.'" On appeal, the Lake County Court of Appeals
affirmed and the case was then brought before the Ohio Supreme
Court.
DECISION OF THE COURT

The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the lower court's denial of
habeas corpus to Bridget, but reversed the decision granting permanent
custody of Jennifer to David.19 First, the court held David's failure to
inform the Ohio court of Bridget's action for custody in Illinois, as re13. Id.
14. For purposes of this casenote, "actual notice" is a term which designates that
a litigant has received information that informs him that a suit is pending. Moreover, it
focuses upon the subjective knowledge of the defendant rather than on the procedural
prerequisites used to determine when technical notice has been served. Although actual
notice is usually not recognized as legally sufficient for purposes of due process, courts
seldom explain why actual notice is insufficient. It is not clear why a defendant who
admits actual knowledge of a suit and has been given an opportunity to be heard, but
chooses not to appear, should have his interests protected at the expense of an innocent child.
15. Brief for Appellee at 2.
16. Ex rel. Pasqualone, No. 78 JUV 1933 (Cook County Juvenile Court, Ohio,
filed November 9, 1978) (writ of habeas corpus). One of the most useful remedies
through which equity exercises its power to protect children is the writ of habeas corpus. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 578 (1968). This is the mechanism
through which appellant, Bridget Pasqualone, sought custody of Jennifer. Historically, habeas corpus was used to obtain the release of an individual wrongfully held for a
criminal offense. See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890). Although the action used to
regain custody is analogous to the older criminal writ, "child custody habeas" affords
the court broader discretion. See New York Foundling Hosp. v. Gahi, 203 U.S. 429
(1906).
17. Ex rel. Pasqualone, No. 78 JUV 1933 (Lake County Juvenile Court, Ohio, filed
November
9, 1978).
18. Notice
of Appeal, Appellate Court Docket No. CA 7-085, Pasqualone
v. Pasqualone, 63 Ohio St. 2d 96, 406 N.E.2d 1121 (1980).
19. Although David was not granted permanent custody on appeal, the court's
determination that David would supply the best interest of the child appears to favor
him if another suit is brought under OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.21-.37 (Page 1980).
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quired by Ohio's version of the UCCJA,20 did not mandate that
Bridget's writ for habeas corpus be granted." Ohio's version of the
UCCJA requires litigants to inform the court of proceedings pending

in other jurisdictions. 2 This requirement opens direct lines of com-

munication between the courts of different states to prevent jurisdictional conflict and to promote judicial assistance in custody cases. 3
Because the disclosure requirements ' had not been met, the Ohio
Supreme Court refused'to grant David permanent custody of Jennifer.
Second, the court ruled that presence of the wife and child in Illinois
was insufficient to give Illinois personal jurisdiction over the father.
Because the Illinois decision was rendered without personal jurisdiction over David Pasqualone, Ohio courts were not bound to apply the
"full faith and credit" clause25 of the United States Constitution.2 6

Third, since the Illinois legislature had only adopted a small segment
of the UCCJA,2 7 the two states' custody laws were not substantially
similar; 28 therefore, Ohio was not compelled by its own statute to acquiesce in, or to enforce, the Illinois decree awarding Bridget
custody. 2 Although not germane to the Pasqualone litigations, it is
20. Ohio's version of the Act may be found at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.21-.37
(Page 1980).
21. Pasqualone v. Pasqualone, 63 Ohio St. 2d 96, 406 N.E.2d 1121 (1980).
22. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.24, .27 (Page 1980). These sections require
that litigants inform the court of all suits pending in other jurisdictions concerning the
custody of the child in question.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1. For a general discussion of this topic, see
Note, Ford v. Ford: Full Faith and Credit to Custody Decrees?, 73 YALE L.J. 134
(1963).
26. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.
27. The Illinois version was similar to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.22 (Page
1980).
28. The Ohio Uniform Child Custody law provides for reciprocal enforcement of
foreign decrees. Nonetheless, if the forum which rendered the original decree does not
have jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with Ohio law, the Ohio
Courts are not bound by the decree. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.31 (Page 1980).
Because the Illinois legislature had only adopted a small segment of the UCCJA
equivalent to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.22 (Page 1980), the Pasqualone court
found the two states' custody provisions were not "substantially similar" and, therefore, not reciprocally binding.
29. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.24 (Page 1980) specifically requires the judge
to determine whether his court is the best forum in which to litigate the matter. Because Illinois had no corresponding provision, the Pasqualone court interpreted this
omission to be determinative of the dissimilarity of the two statutes. As a result, the
court ruled that enforcement of the Illinois decree was not mandated by Ohio statutory
law. On September 11, 1979, a more complete version of the UCCJA became effective
in Illinois. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 2101-2126 (Smith-Hurd 1980). The 1980 Act is
substantially similar to Ohio law. Hopefully, future custody disputes between Illinois
and Ohio will not incur many of the barriers faced by the Pasqualonelitigants.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/14

19811

NO TES

important to note that Illinois has subsequently promulgated a more
complete version of the UCCJA which is substantially similar to Ohio
law. 3" Fourth, the court ruled that Juvenile Court of Lake County,
Ohio had not erred in its determination that David would provide an
environment which was in the best interest of the child, Jennifer.
Even though the court determined that David would supply an environment in Jennifer's best interest, it did not grant him permanent
custody. In summary, David was denied custody because he failed, in
violation of Ohio's disclosure requirements, to inform the court of the
Illinois decision. Bridget was also denied custody because the judgment
upon which her habeas corpus writ was issued was obtained without
proper personal jurisdiction over David. Because no one was granted
permanent custody, the status of the child's custody may still be unsettled.
A. HistoricalDevelopment of Child Custody Jurisdiction
To better understand the current requirements for proper jurisdiction, a brief history of its development is in order. The landmark case
of Pennoyer v. Neff" provides a starting point for modern civil procedure. The case involved a piece of property owned by a non-resident
of the state. When a dispute arose over who had proper title, the state
court ruled in favor of the resident who was personally before the
court. Service of process was never received by the non-resident, nor
did he appear before the court. On appeal, the Supreme Court held
that as long as the person or property at issue remained outside of the
state's territorial boundaries, it would not be subject to the soveriegn
power of the state.3" Pennoyer is also relevant to child custody law because of the distinction the Court drew between actions which are "in
rem" 3 and those which are "in personam." 3 ' The following quote
depicts the distinction as it applies to child custody litigation:
The difference between a proceeding involving the status, custody and
support of children and one involving adjudication of property rights is
too apparent to require elaboration. In the former, courts are no longer
concerned primarily with the proprietary claims of the contestants for the
"res" itself. Custody is viewed not with the idea of adjudicating rights in
the children, as if they were chattels, but rather with the idea of making
30. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 2101-2126 (Smith-Hurd 1980).
31. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
32. Id. at 724.
33. Historically, in rem jurisdiction was invoked when the ownership or status of
property was involved. M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 5 (2d ed. 1979).
34. In personam jurisdiction requires that the court not only have jurisdiction
over the res, but also over the parties of the dispute. Id. at 4.
Published by eCommons, 1981
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the best disposition possible for the welfare of the children. To speak of a
court's cutting off a mother's right to custody of her children, as if it
raised problems similar to those involved in cutting off her rights to a
plot of ground, is to obliterate these obvious distinctions.35
Because the interest in a child is "in-personam" the forum which
litigates a child custody dispute must have jurisdiction over the parties
who have a personal interest in the outcome of the dispute.3" In International Shoe Co. v. Washington," the Supreme Court pronounced
that if a defendant was not within the territory of the state, due process required that he have certain "minimum contacts" with the adjudicating forum before action could be taken against him. 38 While the
requirements of minimum contacts,39 or territorial jurisdiction,' safeguard the interests of parents, they have been severely criticized as inappropriate in child custody disputes." As long as a parent is free
from a court's jurisdictional authority and can avoid minimum contacts with the geographical territory, the status of the child's custody
may continue to be undetermined.' " Not only does this result leave the
child's status undetermined and, therefore, his future unsettled, it may
also invite child-snatching practices by "professionals" who enter a
jurisdiction, remove the child, and place it with a parent outside of the
jurisdiction of the state in which the other parent resides.' 3 Certainly
this scenario does not have the attributes of fair play. Nonetheless,
35. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 541 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
36. 345 U.S. at 533.
37. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
38. Id. at 316.
39. The requirement of minimum contacts is based on the rationale that a litigant
must have some relationship to a state before it is fair for that state to issue a judgment
against him. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
40. Historically, courts acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by
arresting him and keeping him in the dungeon pending the outcome of the case. As
long as the defendant was within the territorial jurisdiction of the arresting officer, the
court had power over the defendant. See M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 32 (2d
ed. 1979).
41. See Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative
Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1232
(1969).
42. Id. It is generally agreed that a child's welfare demands stability and regularity. "If he is continually being transferred from one parent to the other by conflicting
court decrees, he may be a great deal worse off than if left with one parent, even
though as an original proposition some better provision could have been made for
him." H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 326 (1968). See also Application of
Lang, 9 A.D.2d 401, 409, 193 N.Y.S.2d 763, 771 (1959) (generally, the custody of
children is to be established on a long term basis).
43. See Foster, supra note 2.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/14
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traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice', are the
touchstones used to justify the requirement that a potential defendant
have minimum contacts with a jurisdiction before he is subject to its
authority."' In effect, the rights of parents are protected by this rule,
but the legal custody of children is often left unsettled.," By refusing to
enforce a foreign judgment on the grounds that it would be unfair to
the defendant, the courts create a substantial injustice to the child by
depriving it of the stability and certainty necessary for healthy childrearing."'
Much of this result is directly attributable to May v. Anderson"8
which held a custody order is not entitled to full faith and credit if it
was issued without personal jurisdiction over the defendant. In May,
both parties were residents of Wisconsin until they experienced marital
difficulties. Together they agreed that the wife should move to Ohio
with the children to plan her future course while the husband remained
in Wisconsin. After the husband learned his wife did not intend to
return, he filed in Wisconsin for divorce and custody of the children.
After receiving favorable judgments in Wisconsin, he filed a petition
for habeas corpus in an Ohio state court. The petition was granted on
the grounds that the Wisconsin decree was entitled to full faith and
credit in Ohio. On appeal, five members of the Supreme Court reversed holding that the Wisconsin decree was not entitled to full faith and
credit because it was issued without personal jurisdiction over the
defendant mother.' 9 May suggests that any person who is not served
with process in the state or is otherwise not technically under the personal jurisdiction of the court, cannot be bound by its custody
decree. 0 In essence, May protects the defendant's interest in the child,
but not the child's interest in its future.
A major portion of the Pasqualonebriefs focused upon the current
vitality of May as it relates to the issue of personal jurisdiction. David
44. "Fair play and substantial justice" is an eloquent phrase; nonetheless, its
utility as a yardstick to measure jurisdiction is questionable. The basic question is
"how minimum may the contacts be without becoming constitutionally offensive?"

M.

GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE

38 (2d ed. 1979).

45. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
46. See Hazard, May v. Anderson: Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L.
REv. 379, 391 (1958).
47. See generally Bodenheimer, supra note 41; H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 326 (1968). See also Wheeler v. District Court, 186 Colo. 218, 526 P.2d 658
(1974) (purpose of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act is to eliminate jurisdictional
"fishing" and thus prevent emotional harm and injustice to the children involved).
48. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
49. Id.
50. Id. See also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); International Shoe v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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relied on the May decision because of factual similarities between his
own situation and the mother to whom the following quotation refers:
[W]e have before us the elemental question whether a court of a state,
where a mother is neither domiciled, resident nor present, may cut off
her immediate right to the care, custody, management and companionship of her minor children without having jurisdiction over her in personam . . . "It is now too well settled to be open to further dispute that
the 'full faith and credit' clause and the act of Congress passed pursuant
to it do not entitle a judgment in personam to extra-territorial effect if it

be made to appear that it was rendered without jurisdiction over the person sought to be bound."',

David utilized this rationale to argue that since the Illinois court did
not have jurisdiction over his person, the Ohio courts were not bound
to enforce the Illinois decision. 2
Another interpretation of the May decision was advanced by the

Uniform Laws Commission

3

as amicus curiae." The Commission ad-

51. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953) (quoting Baker v. Baker, Eccles &
Co., 242 U.S. 394, 401 (1917)).
52. 345 U.S. at 533; see also 242 U.S. at 401.
53. The Uniform Laws Commission is comprised as follows:
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is composed of Commissioners from each of the states, the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico. In thirty-three of these jurisdictions the Commissioners are appointed by the chief executive acting under express legislative authority. In the
other jurisdictions the appointments are made by general executive authority.
There are usually three representatives from each jurisdiction. The term of appointrnent varies, but three years is the usual period. The Commissioners are
chosen from the legal profession, being lawyers and judges of standing and experience, and teachers of law in some of the leading schools. They are united in a
permanent organization, under a constitution and by-laws, and meet in Annual
Conference in the same vicinity as the American Bar Association, usually for five
or six days immediately preceding the meeting of that Association. The record of
the activities of the National Conference, the reports of its committees, and its approved acts are printed in the Annual Proceedings.
The object of the National Conference as stated in its constitution, is "to
promote uniformity in state laws on all subjects where uniformity is deemed
desirable and practicable." The National Conference works through standing and
special committees. In recent years all proposals of subjects for legislation are
referred to a standing Committee on Scope and Program. After due investigation,
and sometimes a hearing of parties interested, this committee reports whether the
subject is one upon which it is desirable and feasible to draft a uniform law. If the
National Conference decides to take up the subject, it refers the same to a special
committee with instructions to report a draft of an act. With respect to some of
the more important acts, it has been customary to employ an expert draftsman.
Tentative drafts of acts are submitted from year to year and are discussed section
by section. Each uniform act is thus the result of one or more tentative drafts subjected to the criticism, correction, and emendation of the Commissioners, who
represent the experience and judgment of a select body of lawyers chosen from
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/14
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vanced its position that May was moot." Its brief suggests that the
UCCJA has usurped the domain of the May rationale and is the conclusive authority for custody litigation.
The UCCJA is in accord with the common interpretation of the inconclusive decision in May... Under this interpretation a state is permitted to
recognize a custody decree of another state regardless of lack of personal
jurisdiction, so long as the due process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard have been met."
By allowing a state to recognize a custody decree of another state
even though it was granted without personal jurisdiction, the UCCJA
attempts to discourage continuing controversies over child custody.
Similarly, it emphasizes the importance of stable home environments,
secure family relationships, and the finality of judgments."
B.

Policy Consideration SurroundingAmendability of Custody
Decrees

The full faith and credit clause 58 of the United States Constitution
requires interstate recognition of sister state judicial decrees59 but contains no clause limiting its operation to "final ' 60 decrees. Nonetheless,
the requirement of finality has been judicially imposed'.6 Courts have
reasoned that decrees relating to child custody are subject to modification upon a showing of changed circumstances62 and are, in this sense,
non-final. 63 Since the original forum may modify a previous custody
every part of the United States. When finally approved by the National Conference, the uniform acts are recommended for general adoption throughout the
jurisdiction of the United States and are submitted to the American Bar Association for its approval.
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT (U.L.A.), Publisher's Explanation.
54. Brief for Amicus Curiae, Pasqualone v. Pasqualone, 63 Ohio St. 2d 96, 406
N.E.2d 1121 (1980).
55. Id. at 20.
56. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 13, Commissioners' Note.
57.
58.
59.

See note 42 supra.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl.1.
See Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 86 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring).

60. See Fostor & Freed, Modification, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Alimony Orders, 11 CAL. W.L. REv. 280, 281 (1975).
61. See generally Id.; H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 325 (1968).
62. The rationale used to justify modification of a custody decree because of
changed circumstances is based on the concept that the court should insure that the
child's best interests are met. If circumstances change, the interest of the child may no
longer be served by the original situation. For a case which follows this reasoning, see
Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 612 (1947).
63. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 325 (1968).
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decree, it is equally permissible for another forum to do so without
violating any issues of full faith and credit."
In Halvey v. Halvey," the Supreme Court held that if the court of
the state which rendered the judgment had no jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter, the jurisdictional infirmity is not saved by
the full faith and credit clause." The Halveys were married in 1937 and
lived together in New York until 1944 when marital troubles developed. Mrs. Halvey left home with the child and went to Florida to
establish residence there. In 1945, she filed for divorce in Florida. Mr.
Halvey never received personal service of process nor did he appear in
the action. The day before the Florida decree was granted, however,
Mr. Halvey took the child back to New York without the knowlege or
approval of his wife. After obtaining the custody decree from Florida,
Mrs. Halvey brought a habeas corpus proceeding in New York. Instead of simply enforcing the Florida decree, the New York court
modified it on the basis that the Florida court did not see Mr. Halvey
nor did they hear any evidence presented on his behalf concerning his
fitness or his claim to "enjoy the society and association" of his son.6 7
So far as the full faith and credit clause "was concerned," whatever
the Florida court could do in modifying the decree, the New York
court was also permitted to do."
In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Rutledge recognized the
possible ramifications of the frequent relitigation that was implicitly
authorized by the Halvey decision. In his opinion, the practice of continuous relitigation "hardly can be thought conducive to the child's
welfare.""' The Halvey doctrine, along with the assumption that
children need custody decrees which may be freely reopened, encourages relitigation by individuals who have lost the first round of a
custody fight. 7"
Although there may be parental support for such a practice, the
welfare of a child is not improved by frequent changes in custody. 7' In
order to assure stability of custody arrangements and continuity of a
family concept, children may require the constitutional protection of
64. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1. See note 42 supra.
65. 330 U.S. 610, 614 (1947).
66. Id.at 614.
67. Id.at 613-14.
68. Id.
69. Id.at 619.
70. See Bodenheirner, supra note 41, at 1211.
71. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 325, 326 (1968). See also note
42 supra, which deals with the effects of frequent shifts in custody.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/14
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the full faith and credit clause" even more than adults." Even though
constitutional protection may have been warranted in light of an infant's inability to safeguard his own rights," it was not offered by the
Halvey decision."

C. Construction of UCCJA to Further Child's Interest
Much of the Pasqualonecase centers on the proper judicial interpretation of the UCCJA. The general purposes of this Act are:
(1) To avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other
states in matters of child custody... ;
(2) To promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end
that a custody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the
case in the interest of the child;
(3) To assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place
ordinarily in the state with which the child and his family have the closest
connection and where significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training, and personal relationships is most readily available, and
that courts of this state decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child
and his family have a closer connection with another state;
(4) To discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the child;
(5) To deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody awards;
(6) To avoid re-litigation of custody decisions of other states in this state
insofar as feasible;
(7) To facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states;
(8) To promote and expand the exchange of information and other

72.
73.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.

Bodenheimer, supra note 41, at 1212.

74. Because of an infant's mental incapacity to make legal decisions to safeguard
his rights, he is often represented by independent counsel. In response to this need,
courts often appoint a guardian ad litem to prosecute or defend a pending suit on

behalf of the child.
In the Pasqualone case, ad litem counsel for the child deferred her time allocation

in the oral argument to the Uniform Laws Commission as amicus curiae. However, the
court did not take the responsibility of insuring that amicus was heard. As a result, the
positions of neither ad litem counsel nor amicus curiaewere heard on appeal. Interview

with Charles Geron, Attorney for Amicus Curiae on behalf of the Ohio State Board of
Uniform Laws and the National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws,

Pasqualone v. Pasqualone, 63 Ohio St. 2d 96, 406 N.E.2d 1121 (1980), in Xenia, Ohio
(October 1980). (Mr. Geron's assistance and insight have been very helpful and are
greatly appreciated by the author).
75. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
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forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this state and those of
other states concerned with the same child;
(9) To make uniform the law of those states which enact it.'6
In the past, competition and conflict have resulted in the shifting
of children from state to state with harmful effects on their
well-being.1 7 A court of one state may award custody to the father
while another jurisdiction may order that custody be granted to the
mother. 8 In situations such as this, the litigants have no way to know
whom they should obey. Even more serious, a custody decree made in
one state one year is often overturned in another jurisdiction the next
year and the child is then handed over to another family. 79 Because the
law has been so unsettled, physical presence of the child has given a
litigant a large advantage." It is not surprising, then, that custody
claimants have tended to take the law into their own hands; they have
resorted to self help in the form of child stealing, kidnapping, or
various other schemes to gain possession of the child."'
The Ohio version of the UCCJA provides for reciporcal enforcement of foreign decrees to help remedy this confusion. 2 Nonetheless,
if the forum which rendered the original decree does not have jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with Ohio law, the
Ohio courts are not bound by the decree. 3 Because the Illinois legislature had only adopted a small segment of the UCCJA,I" the Pasqualone court found that the two states' custody provisions were not
"substantially similar" and, therefore, not reciprocally binding. Ohio
law specifically requires the judge to determine whether his court is the
best forum in which to litigate the matter. 5 Because Illinois had no
corresponding provision, the Pasqualone court interpreted this omission to be determinative of the dissimilarity of the two statutes. As a
76. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 1.
77. See notes 1-3 supra.
78. See Stout v. Pate, 209 Ga. 786, 75 S.E.2d 748 (1953) and Stout v. Pate, 120
Cal. App. 2d 699, 261 P.2d 788 (1953), cert. denied in both cases, 347 U.S. 968 (1954);
Moniz v. Moniz, 142 Cal. App. 2d 527, 298 P.2d 710 (1956); and Sharpe v. Sharpe, 77
Ill. App. 2d 295, 222 N.E.2d 340 (1966).
79. See Thomas v. Gillard, 203 Pa. Super. 95, 198 A.2d 377 (1964); In re Guardianship of Rodgers, 100 Ariz. 269, 413 P.2d 774 (1966); Berlin v. Berlin, 239 Md. 52,
210 A.2d 380 (1965); Berlin v. Berlin, 21 N.Y.2d 371, 235 N.E.2d 109 (1967), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968); and Batchelor v. Fulcher, 415 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1967).
80. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT (Commissioners' Note).

81.

Id.

82. 14 MILLIGAN, OHIO PRAC. § 4047.02 (1981).
83. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.31 (Page 1980).
84. The former Illinois Statute was equivalent to OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.22
(Page 1980).
85. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.24 (Page 1980).
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result, the court ruled that enforcement of the Illinois decree was not
mandated by Ohio "statutory law."" Although this construction was
permissible by the terms of the Act, it does not appear that it was compulsory. In any event, on September 11, 1979, a more complete version
of the UCCJA became effective in Illinois which renders that question
moot.8 ' The current Illinois Act is substantially similar to Ohio law.
In Wheeler v. District Court," the Supreme Court of Colorado
held that the policy of the UCCJA was to eliminate jurisdictional
fishing and thus prevent emotional harm to the children involved.89
The case involved the question whether a Colorado court lacked
jurisdiction under the UCCJA to hear the matter, but the significance
of the case is the method it provides for reaching a solution to the
question of proper jurisdiction. Not only must the trial court inquire
into the results that may be technically and legally sufficient under the
UCCJA, it must determine the result allowable under the Act that is in
the child's best interest."
The type of approach followed by the Wheeler court recognizes
that the court has a responsibility to protect the child's welfare as well
as the defendant's rights. In the Pasqualonecase, however, the court
primarily focused on the parents while the real issue was the child. In
effect, the Pasqualone court reached one proper interpretation of the
Act but did not demonstrate how that interpretation would best
benefit the child.
D.

Substantial Justice Towards Defendant or Child?

In Shaffer v. Heitner9 ' the United States Supreme Court directed
its attention toward considerations of fairness and substantial justice
by focusing on whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with a
jurisdiction to fairly and justly make a determination against him on a
particular issue.92
In custody matters, perhaps the time has come when the Court
should be more concerned with fairness and substantial justice for the
child rather than the defendant parent. The value of reaching a final
determination of custody may be superior to the value of protecting a
86. Id.
87. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 §§ 2101-26 (Smith-Hurd 1980).
88. 186 Colo. 218, 526 P.2d 658 (1974).
89. Id. at 220, 526 P.2d at 660.
90. See generally Wheeler v. District Court, 186 Colo. 218, 526 P.2d 658 (1974);
see also UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 13 (Commissioners' Note) (the
Act emphasizes the child's welfare as well as requirements for personal jurisdiction).
91. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
92. Id. See also Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559
(1980).
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party who chooses not to litigate after receiving actual notice" of the
proceedings coupled with an opportunity to be heard. Unlike other
litigation, the nature of child custody disputes is unique because of the
human being at the center of the suit. The extent to which the child's
future well-being is dependent upon the court's determination requires
that the spirit of legislation designed to protect children be implemented by the judicial system. 9'4 When all parties have been afforded fair
notice, it is possible that the values of territorial jurisdiction should
become subservient to the value of achieving a final determination of
custody. While affording justice to parents, the courts must insure that
substantial injustice is not done to the child.
CONCLUSION

The Pasqualonecourt applied correct case law as well as statutory
law. Although its interpretation of the law is valid, it is ironic that the
court did not strive to implement the spirit of the UCCJA which is
designed to protect children. The Pasqualonecase, although technically sound, will not discourage continuing controversies. Nor does the
case deter abductions and subsequent modifications of custody
awards." Finally, the Pasqualone decision does not emphasize the
value of curtailing the relitigation of custody decisions. The judicial result reached in this case depicts the very situation which the UCCJA was
designed to remedy. Because of jurisdictional problems' 6 in Bridget's Illinois decision, it was not dispositive of custody. Similarily, because of
statutory noncompliance" in David's Ohio suit for custody, it was also
not dispositive of custody. As a result, after several appearances before
the courts of two states, no one had permanent custody of the child. Her
status is still irresolute. Perhaps this result is unavoidable, but further interpretations and applications of the UCCJA should attempt to implement its purpose of avoiding the psychological trauma of relitigation.
Since the purpose of a custody suit is to reach a final determination
benefitting the child, courts should construe the UCCJA to arrive at
final determinations which minimize uncertainty and provide for continuity, stability, and strong family relationships. This goal can become
reality if the courts focus upon the purpose of the UCCJA rather than on
procedural distinctions which prolong uncertainty.
Wayne Everett Waite
93.

See note 14 supra.

94.
95.
96.
97.

See
See
See
See

notes 41 and 74 supra.
note 2 supra.
notes 28 and 29 supra.
note 22 and accompanying text supra.
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